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THE FTC AND THE GENERIC DOCTRINE:
A NEW Rx FOR PHARMACEUTICAL
TRADEMARKS
I. INTRODUCTION
Pharmaceutical trademarks may soon be the target of heightened
scrutiny by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The Commission
has recently declared that it will be "on the lookout' for situations
where a trademark has become generic.2 This new vigilance in the area
of trademarks has caused concern among some trademark owners espe-
cially in light of two recent FTC actions
In In re Borden, Inc. ,' an Administrative Law Judge of the FTC
ordered compulsory licensing5 of REALEMON, a trademark of Bor-
den, Inc. The other significant action took place in 1978 when the FTC
moved to cancel the trademark FORMICA on the sole ground that it
had become generic. 6 Because both actions were virtually unprece-
dented,7 they have attracted a great deal of attention and have engen-
I. See Dixon, Trademarks, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Lanham Act, 68 TRADE-
MARK REP. 463 (1978).
2. A generic term cannot serve as a trademark. A generic term designates a general type or
class of product, or a common name of a product, e.g., basketball, razor blade, or candy.
The name of a product or service itself-what it is-is the very antithesis of a mark. In
short, a generic name of a product can never function as a trademark to indicate origin.
The terms "generic" and "trademark" are mutually exclusive. . . .[T]he function of a
mark is to identify and distinguish the goods or services of one seller from those sold by
all others. A mark answers the buyer's question "Who are you? Where do you come
from?". But the name of the product answers the question "What are you?"
I J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:1, at 405-06 (footnotes omitted).
3. In re Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Formica Corp., 200
U.S.P.Q. 182 (T.T.A.B. 1978). See 382 PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. A-I (1978).
4. In re Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978); FTC Judge Orders Compulsory Licensing of
'ReaLemon" Trademark, 294 PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. A-1 (1976).
5. Compulsory licensing would make a trademark that was at one time exclusive to the
owner of the trademark available to competitors for a certain period of time. See Dobb, Compul-
sory Trademark Licensure as a Remedyfor Monopolization, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 505 (1978).
6. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Formica Corp., 200 U.S.P.Q. 182 (T.T.A.B. 1978); 382
PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. A-1 (1978). See also Formica Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 200 U.S.P.Q. 641
(C.C.P.A. 1979) (writ of mandamus denied).
7. The 1976 ordering of compulsory trademark licensure of REALEMON was a novel form
of relief in a monopolization case. The Formica action was unprecedented because it was the first
time that a governmental agency, rather than a competitor, had sought cancellation of a trade-
mark on the grounds of genericness.
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dered a great deal of criticism.' The pharmaceutical industry has been
particularly concerned, fearing that the decisions may open a new front
on which to attack pharmaceutical trademarks.9 This comment will
analyze the REALEMON and Formica actions and will examine phar-
maceutical trademarks in light of these recent developments.
II. THE REALEMON DECISION
In August 1976, Administrative Law Judge Daniel H. Hanscom
ordered compulsory licensing of the Borden, Inc. REALEMON trade-
mark. 10 The case was the result of a complaint filed July 2, 1974," t by
the Federal Trade Commission, charging that Borden had violated sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act' 2 by monopolizing the
8. I conclude that compulsory trademark licensing, rather than constituting wise and
vigorous antitrust enforcement, is a sloppy and imprecise antitrust remedy since no one
can predict with accuracy its competitive effect upon a market. Forced licensing of a
trademark is simply an unworkable and self-defeating form of antitrust enforcement.
Even if one accepts the viability of the remedy in a rare case, it must at least be recog-
nized as the most drastic last resort when all else fails. Several other forms of remedies
less offensive to the law, less dangerous to the consumer, less punitive to the trademark
owner and more likely to achieve pro-competitive results are available and must be tried
before one even considers compulsory licensing of a trademark.
McCarthy, Compulsory Licensing of a Trademark: Remedy or Penalty?, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 197,
253-54 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Compulsory Licensing]. See also Ball, Government Versus
Trademarks.: Today-Pharmaceuticals ReaLemon and Formica-Tomorrow?, 68 TRADEMARK
REP. 471 (1977); Palladino, Compulsory Licensing of a Trademark, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 457
(1977); FTC Official.Defends Challenge of 'Formica", 436 PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. A-9 (1979).
9. There is every indication that so long as the "consumerist movement" continues to
gain momentum, the absorption of governmental officials in the area of consumer pro-
tection will increase proportionately. Regrettably, many activists, both in and out of
government, regard trademarks and "consumer protection" as mutually exclusive. No-
where has this been more evident than in the field of pharmaceuticals. . . . It should not
be inferred from this that the current assaults on the trademark system are primarily
limited to one industry. In the past, some trademark owners in other fields have been of
the opinion that, because of the unique characteristics [brand name versus generic drugs]
of the pharmaceutical industry, the controversy would be contained in that particular
arena. Those who have been involved in the debate over pharmaceutical trademarks,
however, recognize familiar themes in the arguments advanced by the FTC in the
ReaLemon and Formica matters.
Ball, supra note 8, at 473-74.
10. FTC Judge Orders Compulsory Licensing of 'ReaLemon" Trademark, 294 PAT. T.M. &
COPYRIGHT J. A-1 (1976).
I1. See FTC Issues Monopolization Complaint; Mandatory Trademark Licensing Sought, 186
PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. A-3 (1974).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). Section 5 provides that:
(a)(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair. . . acts or
practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.
(b) Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any. . . corpora-
tion has been or is using any unfair method of competition or unfair. . . act or practice
in or affecting commerce, and if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it
in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public, it shall issue and serve upon such
... corporation a complaint stating its charges in that respect. ...
2
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marketing and sale of reconstituted lemon juice. Finding that the
REALEMON trademark was a powerful force in the marketplace and
that the "dominance of the REALEMON brand and the acceptance of
the brand by the public ... constitutes a substantial barrier to the en-
try of new bottled lemon juice marketers,"' 3 Judge Hanscom concluded
that the REALEMON mark, "the heart of the monopoly power," must
be eliminated.' 4
Reasoning that there is nothing essentially different about compul-
sory licensing of a patent, a remedy used in the past when a patent has
been determined the source of an antitrust violation, 5 and compulsory
licensing of a trademark, Judge Hanscom ordered that Borden must
for a period of ten years from the date of this order, upon
written request from any person, partnership, corporation or
business entity engaged in or desiring to enter the business of
producing and marketing processed lemon juice, grant a li-
cense to such person, partnership, corporation or business en-
tity to use the name REALEMON on containers of
reconstituted lemon juice.' 6
It was further ordered that Borden would advertise the availability of
the licensing provisions in three trade journals for a period of five years
and that an independent third party, or a party acceptable to both Bor-
den and the licensee, would administer quality control standards
throughout the licensing period. Borden was also awarded a nominal
royalty of not more than one-half of one percent of the dollar sales of
reconstituted lemon juice marketed under the trademark."1
Compulsory patent licensing makes technology that was at one
time exclusive to the owner of the patent available to competitors.
Competitors can thereby enter a market theretofore dominated by the
patentee. Judge Hanscom's analogy to compulsory patent licensing in
the REALEMON trademark case has been criticized as being inappro-
Id.
The creation and maintenance of monopoly power alleged in Borden is in violation of section
2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), and as such is within the scope of section 5.
13. FfC Judge Orders Compulsory Licensing of "ReaLemon" Trademark, 294 PAT. T.M. &
COPYRIGHT J., A-I (1976).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Glaxco Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973); United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 (1950); Charles Pfizer & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 401 F.2d
574, 585-86 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969). See also Comment, Patent Law and
Drug Prices: Implications of the Roche Case, 4 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 189 (1976).
16. FTC Judge Orders Compulsory Licensing of "'ReaLemon" Trademark, 294 PAT. T.M. &
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priate and of questionable constitutionality. 8
The bulk of the REALEMON criticism has been directed at the
fact that compulsory licensing focuses on antitrust concerns while ig-
noring trademark interests. Starting with the proposition that antitrust
civil remedies are to be remedial and not punitive'9 it is argued that
invalidation of a trademark exceeds the antitrust violation sought to be
cured.20 Antitrust remedies should be fashioned to cure the unfair
practices found to be violative of the antitrust laws.2 Because compul-
sory licensing is aimed directly at the trademark, it is a remedy that
ignores fights that have accrued in the trademark and crosses the line
from being remedial to being punitive.22
A trademark can be the source of monopoly power.23 For exam-
ple, when a mark has become generic, it confers upon its holder exclu-
sive use of a term that describes a class of products, making it almost
impossible for competitors to effectively describe their goods in the
marketplace without infringing the trademark and risking litigation. In
such a situation, the law has repeatedly recognized that the generic na-
ture of the mark justifies cancellation.24
18. Because of the basic differences in licensing requirements between patents and trade-
marks, the remedy of compulsory patent licensing cannot be relied upon as precedent for
compulsory trademark licensing. Compulsory trademark licensing carries with it the
seeds of consumer deception and total destruction of rights in the trademark. Such a
remedy creates the danger that it will not prove remedial or pro-competitive, and will not
serve the cause of competitive vigor. Forced trademark licensing thus may be a misno-
mer for what in practice can result in an improperly punitive confiscation of private
property.
Compulsory Licensing, supra note 8, at 253.
19. Antitrust injunctive remedies are to be remedial only and "should not be punitive."
United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 357 (1947). See Compulsory Licensing, supra
note 8, at 208.
20. "While the courts and the Federal Trade Commission have broad and sweeping antitrust
remedial powers, that power should be wisely exercised so as to frame only remedial and not
punitive or confiscatory orders in the wake of an antitrust violation." Compulsory Licensing, supra
note 8, at 253.
21. Under the FTC Act, the remedy selected by the Commission must bear some "reasonable
relation to the unfair practices found to violate section 5." L.G. Balfour Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1, 23 (7th Cir. 1971).
22. "Orders of the Federal Trade Commission are not intended to impose criminal punish-
ment or exact compensatory damages for past acts, but to prevent illegal practices in the future,"
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).
23. "The trade mark may become a detrimental weapon if it is used to serve a harmful or
injurious purpose. If it becomes a tool to circumvent free enterprise and unbridled competition,
public policy dictates that the rights enjoyed by its ownership be kept within their proper bounds."
United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1949), ad and
modfed, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
24. See, e.g., Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965)
(holding "yo-yo" to be generic for return tops); King Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc.,
321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding "thermos" to be generic for vacuum insulated containers);
4
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An antitrust violation where a trademark is involved, however,
does not necessarily mean that the mark has become generic.
A finding that a generic term has been used as a trade-
mark implies the existence of antitrust monopoly power and
therefore justifies invalidation; such a trademark is of no
value to the public. The converse does not hold true, how-
ever. A finding of antitrust monopoly power in a market
dominated by a product sold under a trademark does not nec-
essarily imply genericness, and, consequently, does not justify
invalidation; the trademark, though misused, is in all likeli-
hood valid.
The great danger in ordering compulsory licensing of a
trademark for a violation of antitrust law is that the step may
be taken without any consideration of its impact on trade-
mark interests. If a term acquires such extraordinary power
that it is unlawful to permit its exclusive appropriation, a dec-
laration of genericness is entirely appropriate, and will pro-
mote both antitrust and trademark interests. If, on the other
hand, a trademark is used to violate the antitrust laws, but it is
not a generic term, it is totally inappropriate to declare it
generic sub silentio by means of compulsory licensing.25
Genericness played a confusing role in the REALEMON decision.
Throughout the opinion, Judge Hanscom referred to the REALEMON
mark as "virtually the generic name for bottled lemon juice."26 Yet the
Federal Trade Commission brought the action under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act,27 not the appropriate section of the
Lanham Act that concerns genericness.28 Moreover, it was found that
Borden "engaged in geographically discriminatory pricing in certain
regions where competition threatened, granted discounts to key retail
DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prod. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936)
(holding "cellophane" to be generic for transparent cellulose sheets); Nissen Trampoline Co. v.
American Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Iowa 1961) (holding "trampoline" to be generic
for rebound tumbling nets); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding
"aspirin" to be generic for acetyl salicylic acid).
25. Palladino, supra note 8, at 463 (footnote omitted).
26. FiTC Judge Orders Compulsory Licensing of 'ReaLemon" Trademark, 294 PAT. T.M. &
COPYRIGHT J. A-l, A-2 (1976).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
28. Id. § 1064. Borden raised this point in its opening brief, arguing "that the compulsory
licensing order was in effect a collateral cancellation of the trademark by the F.T.C. without fol-
lowing the law of genericness or the procedures of the Lanham Act." Compulsory Licensing, supra
note 8, at 212 (footnote omitted). The FTC complaint counsel answered to the effect that Borden
should be grateful that the FTC did not try to cancel the registration of the mark, saying, "The
very fact that this proceeding was commenced under section 5 of the F.T.C. Act and not under the
Lanham Act probably saved the ReaLemon trademark from cancellation." Id.
1979]
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stores, and selectively lowered prices so that competitors had to sell at,
or near, their own costs."'29 "Through such behavior, Borden was able
to maintain its monopoly position."3
If Borden's monopoly was threatened and only maintained by the
above described anticompetitive behavior, it is difficult to conclude that
the REALEMON trademark was the "basic and fundamental vehicle
required and used to accomplish the violation."' I Thus, if anticompeti-
tive pricing was required to maintain Borden's monopoly position, the
REALEMON trademark was not the integral or crucial factor in the
antitrust violation. Proof that the mark is the integral part of the anti-
trust violation is the standard applied to those defenses to trademark
infringement provided by the Lanham Act and the general principle of
unclean hands.32
For example, proof that the mark itself is the device used to ac-
complish a violation of the antitrust laws3 3 has been the test in cases
brought under section 33(b)(7) of the Lanham Act. 34 This provision of
the Lanham Act recognizes as a defense to trademark infringement that
the mark has been used in violation of the antitrust laws.35 Federal
registration "carries with it a presumption of exclusive right. . . to use
the word in a trademark sense .. ."I' The effect of section 33(b)(7) is
to defeat the conclusive evidentiary force that federal registration pro-
29. 294 PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. at A-2 (1976).
30. Id.
31. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
32. Unclean hands is a fundamental principle of equity jurisprudence. A plaintiff seeking
equitable relief may be denied relief if he comes to court guilty of any fraudulent or deceitful
behavior concerning the matter in issue.
The maxim that one who comes into equity must come with clean hands expresses rather
a principle of inaction than one of action. It means that equity will refuse its aid in any
manner to one seeking its active interposition if he has been guilty either of unlawful or
inequitable conduct respecting the subject matter of the litigation.
Carmen v. Fox Film Corp., 269 F. 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1920). Thus, a plaintiff trademark owner
seeking an injunction in an infringement suit will be denied relief if the defendant shows the
infringed mark to be generic or the source of an antitrust violation. See Phi Delta Theta Frater-
nity v. J.A. Buchroeder & Co., 251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1966). See generally Note, The Be-
smirched Plaintflandthe ConfusedPublic: Unclean Hands in Trademark Infringement, 65 COLUM.
L. REy. 109 (1965).
33. See Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Murray Sices Corp., 10 F.R.D. 367, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(7) (1976).
35. "The trademark registration shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive
right to use the registered mark ... except when one of the following defenses or defects is estab-
lished:. . .(7) That the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the United
States." Id.
36. Pacific Indus., Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 425 F.2d 1265, 1267 (C.C.P.A.
1970).
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vides.37 But the mark must be indispensable to the anticompetitive be-
havior before section 33(b)(7) is triggered.38
The same strict standard applies under the unclean hands defense.
Case law has recognized that an antitrust violation may be a good de-
fense to a charge of trademark infringement. 39 In Carl Zeiss Sqt/ung v.
VE.B. Carl Zeiss Jena,4 ° the court recognized that an antitrust viola-
tion would furnish grounds for application of an unclean hands defense
but the mark was required to be the integral part of the antitrust viola-
tion.4 The fact that a plaintiff may have violated the antitrust laws,
and, coincidently, also owns a trademark, does not give rise to an un-
clean hands defense, as the antitrust violation would be collateral to the
subject matter of plaintiff trademark owner's suit.42 If trademark inter-
ests are to be adequately acknowledged, the same standard of proof
should apply to actions brought under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act as to those defenses to trademark infringement pro-
vided by the Lanham Act and the general principle of unclean hands.
Compulsory trademark licensing as a remedy in antitrust cases
where a trademark is involved will likely be tantamount to cancellation
of the mark. If today, for example, REALEMON is "virtually" the
generic term for reconstituted lemon juice, surely after ten years of
compulsory licensing, REALEMON will become a generic word. The
test determining when a mark has become generic is "What do the buy-
ers understand by the word for whose use the parties are contend-
ing?"43  After ten years of seeing REALEMON on bottles of
37. Some congressional history, as well as case law dicta, lends support to the view that
§ 33(b)(7) provides an unclean hands defense when plaintiffs registered mark is used to
violate the antitrust laws. However, this is not what the clear language of § 33(b)(7)
provides. Both the language of the statute and its legislative history reveal that the effect
of this section is merely to make the defense of antitrust misuse available to defeat the
conclusive evidentiary force that would otherwise attach to a federal registration. That
is, § 33(b)(7) merely deprives an "incontestable" federal registration of its incontestabil-
ity. If the antitrust violation is used as a defense against any relief for plaintiff for trade-
mark infringement, it must be done under the general principles of trademark misuse
and unclean hands.
2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 31:25, at 419 (footnotes omitted).
38. See Comment, Trade-Marks-Trade-Mark Cancellation and Unenforceabiliy-Use of a
Trade-Mark in Violation of the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1002, 1005 (1957).
39. See Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. J.A. Buchroeder & Co., 251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo.
1966); Sanitized, Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Forstmann
Woolen Co. v. Murray Sices Corp., 10 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
40. 298 F. Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
41. "An essential element of the antitrust misuse defense in a trademark case is proof that the
mark itself has been the basic and fundamental vehicle required and used to accomplish the viola-
tion." Id. at 1315.
42. Id. at 1314-15.
43. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
1979]
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reconstituted lemon juice produced by various manufacturers, the
REALEMON mark will inevitably become synonomous in the public's
mind with reconstituted lemon juice. Compulsory licensing, in all
probability, means that the trademark owner will ultimately lose the
mark.44
III. THE FORMICA CASE
Citing section 14 of the Lanham Act45 which authorizes the can-
cellation of a trademark if the mark has become a common descriptive
name, the Federal Trade Commission on May 31, 1978, petitioned the
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board to cancel the FORMICA trade-
mark. Arguing that the average customer was likely to ask for
FORMICA if he or she wanted a high pressure decorative laminate,46
the FTC alleged that FORMICA had become the common descriptive
name for decorative plastic laminates.47 The Federal Trade Commis-
sion further charged that Formica Corporation had used its trademark
to charge higher prices and to stifle competition in the plastic laminates
market costing consumers an estimated $10 million a year.48
The Formica action is a landmark because it is the first time a
federal agency has sought cancellation of a trademark on the grounds
of genericness. In the past, competing firms either challenged the
trademark directly, alleging the mark had become descriptive, or a
competing firm infringed the mark and argued genericness as a de-
fense.49
In justifying intervention, the Federal Trade Commission argued
that there is little incentive for competitors to challenge generic
marks.5 0 This lack of incentive stems from the fact that when a particu-
lar trademark becomes generic and is subsequently cancelled by a
court, it does not mean that the mark has been expelled from the mar-
ketplace. On the contrary, after cancellation the mark is likely to ap-
pear in the marketplace in even greater numbers as all competitors are
44. The Federal Trade Commission ultimately rejected compulsory licensing in the
REALEMONsituation. See In re Borden, Inc., 406 PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. A-I, D-I (1978).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1976).
46. "What else does a customer ask for if he or she wanted a high-pressure decorative lami-
nate, besides ... FORMICA .... Newsday, July 2, 1979, at 531.
47. 382 PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J., A-I (1978).
48. Id.
49. See generally Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir,
1965); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prod. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601
(1936); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
50. See Dixon, supra note 1, at 466.
[Vol. 15:327
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now allowed to use the mark.5 As Paul Rand Dixon of the Federal
Trade Commission describes:
For one thing, prosecuting cancellation proceedings or de-
fending infringement suits can take a long time and cost a
large amount. And after the lawyers have made their money,
if the challenger has been successful, the reward must be
shared with all its competitors who can now also use the ge-
neric word. As a result, an individual businessman may de-
cide that it is not really in his best interests to challenge a
competitor's generic trademark, because he will have to bear
all of the cost while most of the benefit will inure to others,
who get a free ride at his expense. 2
The Federal Trade Commission argued that in such a situation
there is clearly a role for government to play in that the consuming
public benefits from the cancellation of generic trademarks.5 3 More-
over, the Commission believes that under section 14 of the Lanham
Act, it is obligated as a matter of law to challenge trademarks it views
as having become generic.5 4
Formica is no stranger to trademark challenges. Its mark was ini-
tially challenged on the ground that it had become a generic name in
Formica Corp. v. Newnan Corp."5 In that case Formica opposed New-
nan's application to register NEW-MICA as a trademark for its decora-
tive laminate on the grounds that it so resembled the Formica mark
that it was likely "to mislead purchasers to believe that the goods ema-
nate from or are approved or sponsored by opposer."
5 6
Newnan counterclaimed seeking cancellation of the FORMICA
mark on the ground that the term had become the common descriptive
name of the product identified herein. 7 The Trademark Trial and Ap-
peals Board stated that it was well settled that the burden of proof is on
51. Id. at 467.
52. Id. at 466-67.
53. Id. at 467.
54. Id. at 468. On Nov. 8, 1978, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board upheld the FTC's
authority to bring cancellation actions under section 14 of the Lanham Act. Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Formica Corp., 200 U.S.P.Q. 182 (T.T.A.B. 1978). In a subsequent petition for writ of
mandamus, Formica Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 200 U.S.P.Q. 641 (C.C.P.A. 1979), the court, in denying
Formica's petition, stated that "[wihere, as here, the law at the time of the hearing on Formica
Corporation's motion [to dismiss] was in such an unsettled state, the issue was definitely one for
which 'a rational and substantial legal argument [could have been] made' in support of either
position." Id. at 647. As of this writing, the final disposition of the case is still pending.
55. 149 U.S.P.Q. 585 (T.T.A.B. 1966).
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the party "asserting that an otherwise arbitrary trademark. . . has be-
come a common descriptive name for the article.""8 After "giving due
consideration to the fact that opposer is the only manufacturer of lami-
nated plastics to have used the term 'FORMICA' in connection with
the sale thereof," 9 the court decided "the showing made by applicant
is considered to fall far short of establishing that 'FORMICA' has lost
its primary significance as indicating laminated plastic materials of op-
poser's manufacture. ' 6  The FTC will now have the burden of show-
ing that in the fourteen years since Newnan, the term FORMICA has
passed into the public domain.
IV. THE ROLE OF TRADEMARKS IN THE MARKETPLACE
Trademarks have become familiar items in our consumer oriented
society.6 1 As of 1978, over one million trademarks had been registered,
with over 400,000 estimated to be in active use.62
Trademarks have been used for centuries as a means of identifying
the origin or source of the goods to which they are affixed.63 Trade-
marks were used in medieval times both to aid illiterate material han-
dlers in identifying the owner of shipped goods and to aid the guilds in
supervising their manufacture.' References to branding, perhaps the
earliest form of trademark, are found as early as the Book of Genesis.65
58. Id. at 587.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. [Ihe average American male is awakened by the alarm of a "Westclox" clock, He
arises and walks on the "Callaway" or "Barwick" carpet to the bathroom. He brushes
his teeth with "Ipana" toothpaste on a "Dr. West" toothbrush and applies "Foamy"
shaving cream to be removed by a "Gillette" or "Schick" razor. After a stimulating
shower with "Ivory" soap and while listening to the newscast from an "RCA" or
"Philco" radio, he hurries into his "BVD" underwear, dons an "Arrow" or "Gant" shirt
freshly laundered with "Duz" from the "Laundromat," puts on his "Elgin" watch and
rushes downstairs to breakfast. In the kitchen, where the linoleum is bright with a coat
of "Johnson's" wax, he snatches two slices of "Southern" bread from the "Toastmaster"
toaster and consumes a cup of "Maryland Club" coffee and a glass of "Minute Maid"
orange juice taken from the "Frigidaire" or "Coldspot" refrigerator. After breakfast he
enjoys a "Lucky Strike" or "Winston" cigarette. Should he cut or burn his finger, he
would apply "Vaseline" petroleum jelly or a "Band-Aid" bandage. He dons his new
"Stetson" hat and drives his "Ford" automobile to work. On the way he will be re-
minded by his "Motorola" radio that "things go better with Coke."
Lunsford, Trademarks: Prestige, Practice and Protection, 4 GA. L. Rnv. 322, 322-23 (1970).
62. Dixon, supra note 1, at 464.
63. See Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265
(1975). See generally F. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO
TRADEMARKS (1925).
64. See Treece & Stephenson, A Look at American Trademark Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 547 (1975).
65. Genesis 4:15.
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Today, besides indicating origin, trademarks perform a variety of
functions. Trademarks are a means of advertising.66 The psychologi-
cal appeal of trademarks is increasingly being made use of by advertis-
ers and marketers.67 For example, it is currently fashionable to display
the designer's name or mark on clothing. Although such conspicuous
consumption is often based on less than rational motivations, the law
has seen fit to recognize the psychological appeal of trademarks.68
Trademarks also serve to assure quality. "An important ingredi-
ent of the premium brand inheres in the consumer's belief, measured
by past satisfaction and the market reputation . . . that tomorrow's can
will contain the same premium product as that purchased today. ' 69 In-
deed, many writers have dubbed this quality assurance function the
trademark's principle contribution to our modem, complex marketing
and distribution system.7"
Because of the important role trademarks play in the operation of
our economy,7 the law has accorded them substantial protection.
7 2
Trademarks, however, may also have harmful economic side effects.73
Over time, they may become the common descriptive name of the
product, thereby causing confusion 74 and deception in the market-
66. "Today, a trade-mark performs a three-fold function: (1) to indicate origin; (2) to guaran-
tee; and (3) to advertise and sell." Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Founders Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 115 F. Supp. 787, 792 (N.D. Calif. 1953).
67. See, e.g., For Many Firms.- New Names, New Images, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, July
4, 1977, at 55.
68. "The protection of trademarks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of
symbols .... Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark,
in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears."
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co. 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
69. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Borden Co. 383 U.S. 637, 651 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting
opinion).
70. See generally Hanak, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks, 43 FORDHAM L.
REv. 363 (1974). Those who oppose legislation to restrict the use of pharmaceutical trademarks
are quick to point to the quality assurance function of the mark. "Drug products would appear on
the market cloaked behind the anonymity of the name of their active ingredient, with the
medicine of the least conscientious manufacturer undistinguished from that of the manufacturer
who strives to maintain the highest standards." PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURER'S AssoCIA-
TION, DRUGS ANONYMOUS 10 (1967).
71. See generally 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 3:1-:5, at 85-96.
72. A trademark owner upon a showing that his mark has been infringed can obtain injunc-
tive and monetary relief. See generally 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 30:1-:32, at 328-70.
73. See generally Dixon, supra note 1, at 464.
74. Paul Rand Dixon, Commissioner of the FTC, describes the confusion a generic mark can
produce:
Back in 1920, for example, a consumer with a headache and sore throat would have gone
to his local pharmacist in search of relief. The following dialogue might then have taken
place:
Consumer: "I'd like some aspirin, please."
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place.75 Such a situation facilitates the accumulation of excessive mar-
ket power by particular manufacturers and may thereby operate to
restrain competition. The law has long recognized, however, that when
a mark becomes generic, that is, when it has become the product's com-
mon name, it no longer performs the vital economic functions for
which it is accorded protection.76
Instead, generic marks may operate to deceive consumers and
restrain competition. When a mark has become generic, most
of the public think that it stands for a class of products or
services, rather than just a designation of origin. People for
whom the trademark has become generic are thus mislead as
to the function of the word. They are, as a result, likely to
seek out and pay for brands using the generic word, without
giving adequate consideration to similar or identical products
of competitors, because those competitors' products appear to
be something other than "the real thing. 77
Courts recognized as early as 1878 that a trademark no longer de-
served protection when it became a common descriptive name.78 In
that year, an English court held that the mark LINOLEUM had be-
come generic for a particular type of floor and counter-top covering,
that there was no longer any justification for according the mark pro-
tection, and that the mark had consequently passed into the public do-
main.79 In the United States the law has followed the same course.
Words such as shredded wheat, 8° yo-yo, 81 aspirin,82 cellophane, 83 tram-
poline,84 and thermos 85 were all at one time trademarks and the exclu-
sive property of particular firms. Even the trademark SINGER, the
Pharmacist: "That'll be 10 cents for a box of Bayer Aspirin, sir."
Consumer: "Well, I was sort of hoping to spend a little less." (This is 1920, after
all.)
Pharmacist: "Let's see now, we have some very fine Brand X acetyl salicylic acid
in tablet form, for only 8 cents."
Consumer: But I don't want any silly sally acid, I want aspirin."
Pharmacist: "Well, sir, it's really just about the same thing."
Consumer: "Then why isn't it called aspirin?"
Id. at 465.
75. See generally Zivin, Understanding Generic Words, 63 TRADEMARK REP. 173 (1973).
76. Dixon, supra note 1, at 465.
77. Id.
78. Linoleum Mfg. Co. v. Nairn, 7 Ch. D. 834 (1878).
79. Id.
80. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
81. Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965).
82. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
83. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prod. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S.
601 (1936).
84. Nissen Trampoline Co. v. American Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Iowa 1961).
[Vol. 15:327
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name of the original product manufacturer, was at one time held to
have passed into general use as the generic term describing a certain
type of sewing machine.16
Terms which are too descriptive also do not qualify for protection
as trademarks. Descriptive terms are too depictive of what a product is,
does, or what a product is made of. For example, the phrase "Brown
Milled" was refused registration as a mark for surgeon's gloves because
it was descriptive of the process of manufacture.8 7 Similarly, Andes
Candies, Inc., was refused registration of "Creme de Menthe" for "lam-
inated chocolate mint candy squares" because it was too descriptive of
the product's flavor.88
Through years of exclusive use, however, a descriptive term may
acquire secondary meaning.89 Secondary meaning refers to the situa-
tion where a descriptive term has come to be accepted as a trademark;
in other words, the term has taken on a separate significance as a prod-
uct identification.90 For example, Q-TIPS, though somewhat descrip-
tive of cotton swabs, has been held as a valid trademark due to its
acquired secondary meaning.9
The concept of descriptive terms and generic terms are closely re-
lated. There is a fine and perhaps indefinable line between descriptive
and generic marks. "In a sense, a generic designation is the ultimate in
descriptiveness."92 On what side of this imprecise line the mark falls is
crucial.93 "If determined to be generic, that term can never function as
a mark or be given trademark protection; but if determined to be de-
scriptive, the word can be given trademark protection upon proof of
85. King Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963). Seegener-
ally Zivin, supra note 75, at 173.
86. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). SINGER, through long and
continuous exclusive use, later regained its trademark status. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d
519 (5th Cir. 1953).
87. American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Rexall Drug & Chem. Co., 159 U.S.P.Q. 380 (T.T.A.B.
1968).
88. In re Andes Candies, Inc., 478 F.2d 1264 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
89. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 15:1, at 514.
90. "Secondary meaning is the magic wand of consumer recognition which may transform
even the most common and descriptive term into a well-known ... mark entitled to all the pro-
tection the law affords . I..." d. at 519.
91. Q-TIPS, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845 (D.N.J. 1952) aft'd, 206 F.2d 144,
(3rd Cir.), modfled, 207 F.2d 509 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953).
92. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 12:5, at 413.
93. Courts have reached opposite conclusions concerning the same term. Compare American
Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Creame Laboratories, Inc., 420 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929,
400 U.S. 820 (1970) (finding a mark unprotectable because generic) with Aloe Creame Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970) (finding a mark
not generic, but merely descriptive, and unprotectable due to lack of secondary meaning).
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secondary meaning."94
There are two kinds of generic words. First, words that are inher-
ently generic such as "water", "ice", or "cola"95 can never acquire sec-
ondary meaning and cannott function as a valid trademark for the
particular product they describe. Then there are words such as "cello-
phane" that were once valid trademarks but have become so associated
with the genus of product in the public's mind that they lose their
trademark function.96 The test determining whether a trademark has
become generic remains the standard laid down by Judge Learned
Hand in Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. , that is, do the buyers under-
stand the trademark as a designation of source, or as the common name
for what the product is. A finding of the latter justifies nonprotection of
the mark on the ground of genericness. This is the standard the Fed-
eral Trade Commission must meet if it is to sustain its challenge of the
FORMICA trademark.
VI. ALARM IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Brand name drugs often sell at a cost two to ten times higher than
their generic counterparts. 9 For example, EQUANIL, a brand name
for the tranquilizer meprobamate, sells wholesale for $7.06 per hun-
dred99 while a generic version sells for $1.00 per hundred. °0 Because
of such disparities, brand name prescription pharmaceuticals have been
the subject of debate for many years.' 0' The fact that prescription
pharmaceuticals usually fall outside the scope of health insurance cov-
erage as well as the consumer movement of recent years are factors
94. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 12:5, at 413-14.
95. See Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F.2d 352 (4th Cir.), cer. denied,
314 U.S. 629 (1941).
96. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prod. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S.
601 (1936).
97. 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). The test of genericness in this case, as stated by Judge
Learned Hand, is simply:
What do the buyers understand by the word for whose use the parties are contending? If
they understand by it only the kinds of goods sold, then, I take it, it makes no difference
whatever what efforts the plaintiff has made to get them to understand more. He has
failed, and he cannot say that, when the defendant uses the word, he is taking away
customers who wanted to deal with him ....
Id.
98. See FDA Drug List." Key to Generic Substitution, FDA CONSUMER, Feb. 1979, at 15 [here-
inafter cited as FDA Drug List].
99. DRUG Topics RED BOOK 188 (1980).
100. Id. at 290.
101. See, e.g., An Ax Is Proposedfor High-Priced Ar's, CONSUMER REPORTS, Jan. 1975, at 48;
Generic Drugs: How GoodAre They?, FDA CONSUMER, Feb. 1978, at 19.
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perhaps most responsible for generating the controversy."' 2
Government, at both the state and federal level, has taken meas-
ures aimed at supplying consumers with lower priced drugs. For exam-
ple, a large majority of states have displaced antisubstitution laws with
legislation permitting or requiring the substitution of a generic
equivalent when a doctor prescribes a brand name drug." 3 Antisubsti-
tution laws, which for decades required pharmacists to fill prescriptions
as written, also functioned to insure brand name market dominance."
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has encouraged prosubsti-
tution legislation and has written a model substitution law and com-
piled an Approved Drug Product List which lists brand name drugs
and their therapeutically equivalent substitutes.0 5
Substitution legislation is of two basic varieties. The first type,
adopted in a majority of states that have enacted substitution legisla-
tion, 0 6 leaves substituting a "generic equivalent'' ° for a brand name
product within the discretion of the pharmacist. The second variety of
substitution legislation, adopted in only a few states,10 8 requires the
pharmacist to substitute, subject only to specific prohibition by the pre-
scribing physician or the purchaser. Alaska and New Mexico further
require the pharmacist to advise the prescribing physician that he has
altered the prescription. 0 9 Delaware allows a pharmacist to dispense a
therapeutically equivalent generic only if the prescribing physician en-
dorses substitution on the prescription and only if certain other condi-
102. See generally Ball, supra note 8, at 473-74.
103. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.80.295 (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 465.30 (West Supp. 1979);
Ky. REv. STAT. § 217.014, .822, .826, .894 (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12D
(Supp. 1979); MIcH. Comp. LAWS § 333.17755 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 6E-7 (West
Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-3-3 (1978); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6816-a (McKinney Supp.
1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 960.3 (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-19-38 (Supp. 1978). See
generally Willig, The Prosubstitution Trend in Modern Pharmacy Law, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1
(1972).
104. Since physicians usually prescribed by brand name, antisubstitution legislation required
the pharmacist to fill the prescription as written with the higher priced brand name drug. For an
example of an antisubstitution statute, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 353.21 (1971).
105. See FDA Drug List, supra note 98, at 15.
106. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.21 (West Supp. 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-7-505
(1979).
107. Whether generics are in fact equivalent is a subject of heated debate. See Generic Drugs:
How Good.re They?, FDA CONSUMER, Feb. 1978, at 19; Ball, supra note 8, at 474; Willig, supra
note 103, at 7.
108. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.80.295 (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 465.30 (West Supp. 1979);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-3-3 (1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 960.3 (Purdon 1977).
109. ALASKA STAT. § 08.80.295 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-3-3 (1978).
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tions are met."10 State substitution statutes are supposed to create
incentive for pharmacists to stock low-priced brands while forcing
"first brands to protect their sales by offering a lower price."' t t
Perhaps of greatest concern to the pharmaceutical industry, keep-
ing in mind the tenor of the arguments in the REALEMON and
Formica actions, is a report issued by the FTC which concluded that
pharmaceutical trademarks prevented low-priced generic substitutes
from achieving market success." 2
Some ninety percent of all prescriptions are written for brand
name drugs.1 3 The authors of the FTC report discovered that it was
the pharmaceutical trademark itself that insured this market domina-
tion. Physicians were so responsive to trademarks that even after the
patent had run out on the drug product and a comparable low priced
generic version became available, physicians continued to prescribe the
much higher priced brand name. 14 This situation stems not only from
past satisfaction with pharmaceuticals sold under the trademark but
also from the fact that most pharmaceuticals have three names. As
Federal Trade Commission Chairman Michael Pertschuk described:
It is understandable that physicians do and will continue to
prescribe by brand name. . . .It's easier and quicker. Most
drug products have three names. Take Librium. It has a
chemical name intelligible only to accomplished organic
chemists, not pronounceable here; a generic name-
chlordiazepoxide hydrochloride; and then a trade name
which, if registered can be used exclusively. What busy phy-
sician wouldn't prefer a tradename such as Librium to the ge-
neric?' 15
The report suggests two solutions. First, the report recommends
the repeal of all state antisubstitution statutes." 6 This legislation is a
remnant of the days when the drug industry was poorly policed. It
guaranteed consumers the high quality the major brands had to of-
110. For example, the prescribed drug is not among the drugs or class of drugs which appear
on Delaware's Nonequivalent Drug List. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2589 (Supp. 1978),
111. See R. BOND & D. LEAN, SALES, PROMOTION AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN Two
PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKETS 89 (1977).
112. "The trademark protection of brand names thus appears to bar the success of low-priced,
substitute brands and, within the framework of the present drug distribution system, that barrier
appears to be far more powerful than patent protection." Id. at 85.
113. FDA Drug List, supra note 98, at 17. See also ALBANY COLLEGE OF PHARMACY, 15TH
ANNUAL PRESCRIPTION SURVEY (1971).
114. R. BOND & D. LEAN, supra note 111, at 85.
115. FDA Drug List, supra note 98, at 17.
116. R. BOND & D. LEAN, supra note 111, at 89.
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fer. 117 Second, the report proposes limiting all pharmaceutical trade-
marks to a single twenty year term." 8 Thus, when the patents run out
on the particular pharmaceutical, competitors would be able to use not
only the chemical formula, but also the trademark the product origina-
tor adopted for the drug," 9 denying the pharmaceutical industry the
trademark protection given to others. 2 ' It is clear, however, consider-
ing the FTC's efforts in the REALEMON and Formica cases, that the
Commission is not limited to these proposals. The arguments used in
the REALEMON and Formica actions are potentially applicable to
pharmaceutical trademarks.
VII. NEW ASSAULTS ON PHARMACEUTICAL TRADEMARKS
The FTC, citing Formica and section 14 of the Lanham Act, could
potentially seek cancellation of particular pharmaceutical trademarks
on the ground of genericness. Of the 200 most frequently prescribed
drugs, 117 are available only from a single manufacturer. In such a
situation the trade name of the product is likely to become, in the mind
of the consumer, the name of the product; that is, what the product is.
Section 14 of the Lanham Act arguably authorizes the FTC to pursue
cancellation proceedings in cases where a mark has become the com-
mon name for a particular product.12 '
If the FTC sought to bring cancellation proceedings against cer-
tain pharmaceutical trademarks on the ground of genericness, the fact
that prescription pharmaceuticals are not sold directly to consumers is
117. FDA Drug List, supra note 98, at 15.
118. R. BOND & D. LEAN, supra note 111, at 89-90.
119. Pharmaceutical patents are limited to a single seventeen year term. Senator Edward
Kennedy's Drug Regulation Reform Bill would effectively limit pharmaceutical patents to seven
years by allowing competitors to file abbreviated New Drug Applications after seven years of
marketing by the original manufacturer. S. 1075, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 125, 125 CONG. REc.
S13475 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1979). Senator Kennedy, in support of the bill, has stated that:
Research and development is the backbone of the private sector. It is especially
important in the pharmaceutical industry. This legislation recognizes the need to protect
the innovative company's investment while at the same time largely eliminating dupli-
cate testing. For the first 7 years after a new product is approved the second manufac-
turer must duplicate all the original data. After the seventh year, the product can be
marketed without such a duplication, if they can demonstrate that they make an identi-
cal product. Because this is far less costly than duplicative testing, few firms are likey
[sic] to spend the time and money to repeat the clinical trials. Thus, the originator has
strengthened market protection for 7 years, and competitors have a much lower barrier
to entry after the seventh year.
Id. at S13465 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
120. The buyer, however, could still differentiate brands by their manufacturer, e.g., Parke-
Davis Meprobamate.
121. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1976); Dixon, supra note 1, at 467.
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recognized by the law and represents another obstacle an FTC action
must overcome.' 22 Courts have distinguished between a professional
class of buyers and the general public. 23 Since professionals will likely
recognize a term which appears to the general public as a generic word
to be a trademark, no confusion results and the particular term may
continue to function as a trademark. For example, in Bayer Co. v.
UnitedDrug Co., 24 involving infringement of Bayer Company's trade-
mark for acetyl salicylic acid, ASPIRIN, the court recognized the dis-
tinction between two classes of buyers:
The case, therefore, presents a situation in which, ignoring
sporadic exceptions, the trade is divided into two classes, sep-
arated by vital differences. One, the manufacturing chemists,
retail druggists, and physicians, has been educated to under-
stand that "Aspirin" means the plaintiff's manufacture, and
has recourse to another and an intelligible name for it, actu-
ally in use among them. The other, the consumers, the plain-
tiff has, consciously I must assume, allowed to acquaint
themselves with the drug only by the name "Aspirin," and has
not succeeded in advising that the word means the plaintiff at
all. 125
In Bayer, the court fashioned a remedy based on the distinction
between the two classes of customers involved. Finding that ASPIRIN
had become the popular name for acetyl salicylic acid among the gen-
eral public, the court ruled that the defendant who had initially in-
fringed the mark was thereafter free to sell the drug directly to
consumers calling it "aspirin." At the same time, Judge Hand enjoined
use of the word "aspirin" by the defendant in sales of quantities of
greater than fifty tablets to "manufacturing chemists, physicians, and
retail druggists."' 26
Similarly, in Ross- Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline & French Labora-
tories127 the court held that since the drug DEXEDRINE was sold only
122. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 513. Judge Hand continues:
If the defendant is allowed to continue the use of the word of the first class, certainly
without any condition, there is a chance that it may get customers away from the plaintiff
by deception. On the other hand, if the plaintiff is allowed a monopoly of the word as
against consumers, it will deprive the defendant, and the trade in general, of the right
effectually to dispose of the drug by the only description which will be understood.
Id. at 513-14.
126. Id. at 514.
127. 207 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1953).
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on prescription, it was irrelevant that the general public thought the
trademark to be a generic name since the prescribing physician knew it
to be a valid trademark. 2 In defending its challenged trademark,
Formica alleged that this distinction applied to its situation. Formica
claimed that "90 percent of all decorative laminate is sold to or speci-
fied by professionals such as distributors, furniture manufacturers and
designers."'2z9
The FTC, when bringing generic cancellation suits, will have to
meet the standard laid down by Judge Hand in Bayer Co. v. United
Drug Co. 130 and overcome the distinction made in case law between
professional buyers and the general consuming public. Since
pharmaceuticals are handled principally by a professional class, these
factors might thwart efforts to cancel pharmaceutical trademarks on the
ground of genericness.' 13
Compulsory trademark licensing is another method the Federal
Trade Commission might pursue to restrict pharmaceutical trade-
marks. Compulsory trademark licensing could be requested as a rem-
edy for violation of section 5 of the FTC Act.'32 There is some author-
ity for the proposition that a trademark will not be recognized if it has
been used in violation of the antitrust laws. In Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
VE.B. Carl Zeiss Jena,133 the court stated that "[a]lthough the issue is
not free from doubt, we believe that a court, in the exercise of its equity
powers, may deny enforcement of a trademark on the part of one who
128. Id. The court, paraphrasing 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 735, Illustration 3, at 613-14
(1938), stated:
A [Smith, Kline & French] invents a medicinal product for which he secures a patent
and which he markets to druggists for resale. He gives the product the name [dextro-
amphetamine sulfate] and markets it under the name [DEXEDRINE] as his trademark.
He sells the product in bulk to druggists who then put it up in smaller packages and sell
it to consumers as [DEXEDRINE] prepared by them. In the course of years [DEX-
EDRINE] becomes the only name by which the product is known to consumers and they
regard the name as the generic designation for the product. Druggists, however, know
the technical name and know that [DEXEDRINE] is A's [Smith, Kline & French's]
brand name for the product. A's [Smith, Kline & French's] interest in the designation is
then not protected in sales to ultimate consumers; but it is protected, as far as practicable,
in sales to druggists.
207 F.2d at 195.
129. Newsday, July 2, 1979, at 531.
130. 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y.. 1921).
131. Genericness suits by the FTC are in jeopardy on a second frout. By a 321-63 vote on
November 27, 1979, the House passed an authorization bill, H.R. 2313, that would bar the FTC
from using funds to seek cancellation of trademarks that have allegedly become generic. See
House Passes Measure to Halt FTCA4tacks on Generic Marks, 457 PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. A-
5 (1979).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
133. 298 F. Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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has used that trademark in violation of the antitrust laws. ''13 4
Thus, the Federal Trade Commission's finding that pharmaceuti-
cal trademarks are the source of monopoly power and function to re-
strain competition in the pharmaceutical industry justifies a remedy
directed at the mark. A remedy directed at the trademark should not
have been applied in the REALEMON case because, to a large extent,
the antitrust violation was the product of various forms of anticompeti-
tive behavior and not of use of the trademark. Most of the cases di-
recting a remedy at a trademark have failed because the defendant
failed to prove the trademark the activating force in the antitrust viola-
tion. 35
VIII. CONCLUSION
Compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical trademarks could poten-
tially bring lower priced pharmaceuticals into the marketplace. The
remedy, however, remains a drastic one and represents a severe depar-
ture from the traditional philosophy of trademark law and practice in
the United States. Substitution legislation, on the other hand, in theory
deals with the problem of high priced pharmaceuticals without knock-
ing over the trademark applecart.
The actual success, however, of substitution legislation is mixed.
The pharmaceutical industry, somewhat successfully, has attempted to
undermine substitution efforts through advertising campaigns aimed at
physicians.' 36 The New York efforts at substitution, for example, are
considered a dismal failure. 37
Governmental attempts to reduce the market domination of brand
name pharmaceuticals are perhaps entering a new phase. Stringent
substitution legislation, along with close monitoring of anticompetitive
behavior by the industry,138 will be utilized. But government determi-
nation to bring low priced drugs to consumers coupled with the new
vigilance in the area of trademarks exhibited in the REALEMON and
134. Id. at 1314.
135. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Howard Johnson Co., 386 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
136. See Firms Criticized on Generic Law, Newsday, July 27, 1978, at 41; 125 CoNa. REc.
S13465 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); PMA NEWSLETrTER 6 (June 26,
1978).
137. See Ball, supra note 8, at 484 n.54.
138. FTC Chairman Pertschuk has promised that the Commission's staff would work with the
FDA and appropriate state agencies to "vigilantly monitor attempts by the pharmaceutical indus-
try to undermine substitution legislation." d. at 484-85 n.54.
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